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Abstract
We present Jalapa, a tool for securing Java bytecode programs with history-based usage policies. Policies
are deﬁned by usage automata, that recognize the forbidden execution histories. Usage automata are
expressive enough to allow programmers specify of many real-world usage policies; yet, they are simple
enough to permit formal reasoning. Programmers can sandbox untrusted pieces of code with usage policies.
The Jalapa tool rewrites the Java bytecode by adding the hooks for the mechanism that enforces the given
policies at run-time.
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1 Introduction
Security has been a major concern in the design and implementation of Java, start-
ing from its early incarnations. Building upon the “safety pillars” of bytecode
veriﬁcation and secure class loading, new defence mechanisms have been developed
over the years.
With the release of the JDK 1.0, a mechanism was provided to run untrusted
mobile code into a sandbox with limited computational functionalities. The default
sandbox prevented untrusted code from, e.g. accessing the local ﬁle sytem, from
redeﬁning the security manager (otherwise one could circumvent the sandbox), from
connecting to (or accepting a connection from) any URL other than the one the code
was downloaded, etc. Although these functionalities were completely customizable,
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this required to subclass the security manager, making it diﬃcult to separate the
functional aspects of programming from the security aspects.
While retaining the basic sandbox model of the JDK 1.0, the JDK 1.1 featured a
“black or white” security model, based on digital signatures. Java-enabled browsers
could be conﬁgured to trust digitally-signed mobile code, provided that the signa-
ture was put by a trusted entity. Trusted code were granted full privileges, while
untrusted code were run without any privilege.
Starting with the JDK 1.2, a more ﬁne-grained mechanism was devised, based
on stack inspection [9]. This provides for associating methods with “protection
domains” that reﬂect their provenance, and for deﬁning a global security policy
that grants each protection domain a set of permissions. Code includes local checks
that guard access to critical resources. At run-time, an access authorization is
granted when all the methods on the call stack have the required permission (a
special case is that of privileged calls, that trust the methods below them in the
call stack). Being strongly biased towards implementation, this mechanism suﬀers
from some major shortcomings. For instance, since a method removed from the call
stack no longer aﬀects security, stack inspection does not oﬀer any protection when
trusted code uses objects supplied by untrusted code [8].
Although many security policies are not enforceable by stack inspection, at
present Java oﬀers no other facilities to specify and enforce user-deﬁned policies.
Therefore, it is common practice to renounce to separating duties between function-
ality and security, and to implement the needed enforcement mechanism with local
checks explicitly inserted into the code by programmers. Since forgetting even a
single check might compromise the security of the whole application, programmers
have to inspect their code very carefully. This may be cumbersome even for small
programs, and it may also lead to unnecessary checking.
History-based security has been repeatedly proposed as a replacement for stack
inspection [1,7,11]. Clearly, the ability of checking the whole execution history,
instead of the call stack only, places history-based mechanisms a step forward stack
inspection, from the expressivity viewpoint. However, since many possible history-
based models can be devised, it is crucial to choose one which wisely conciliates the
expressive power with the theoretical properties enjoyed. It is also important that
the security mechanism can be implementated in a way that makes it transparent
to programmers, and with a negligible run-time overhead.
Jalapa advocates local usage policies [3] as a history-based model for securing
Java applications. Some remarkable features of Jalapa are that:
• local usage policies are expressive enough to model security requirements of
real-world applications. For instance, we used them to specify the typical set
of policies of a realistic bulletin board system [10].
• at the same time, usage policies are simple enough to be statically amenable,
e.g. they can be model-checked against abstractions of program usages [4].
• local usage policies generalise global policies and local checks. The ability of
sandboxing a piece of code by localizing the scope of a policy is particularly
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relevant, as the current programming methodologies provide for reusing code,
and for exploiting services and components, oﬀered by untrusted third parties.
• apart from the localization of sandboxes, enforcing policies is completely trans-
parent to programmers.
• since the enforcement mechanism is based on bytecode rewriting, it does not
require a custom Java Virtual Machine.
• even when the program source code is unavailable, Jalapa allows for specifying
and enforcing policies on its behavior, by directly modifying the bytecode.
This paper gives an overview of Jalapa. We start by presenting our methodology
for securing Java applications through local usage policies, with the help of some
examples. Then, we give some insights about the design and the implementation
of our tool, and we summarise the artifacts supporting our tool. We conclude by
highlighting some of the present and future challenges of Jalapa.
2 Securing Java with local usage policies
We illustrate our methodology for securing Java programs, as well as some key
features of Jalapa, with the help of an example. Suppose you have a simple Web
browser whose functionality can be extended with plugins, and with methods for
handling connections and cookies. Since plugins can be downloaded from the net-
work, possibly from untrusted sites, we want to control their behaviour, and block
their execution at the moment they attempt some malicious action. In particular,
we focus here on two conﬁnement policies, that prevent plugins from transmitting
data read from the local ﬁle system, either directly or by exploiting cookies to im-
plement a covert communication channel (although stronger, these policies imply
non-interference). Before formally specifying these policies, we consider a skeletal
implementation of the classes Browser and Plugin.
public class Browser {
private Map<URL,String> cookies;
public Browser() { cookies = new HashMap<URL,String>(); }
public void connect(URL url) throws Exception {
URLConnection uc = url.openConnection();
out = new BufferedWriter(new OutputStreamWriter(uc.getOutputStream()));...}
public void writeCookie(URL u, String msg) { cookies.put(u,msg); }
public String readCookie(URL u) { return cookies.get(u); }
}
public abstract class Plugin implements Runnable {
Plugin(Browser browser, String name, URL codebase) { ... }
public void doIt() { try { // invokes this.run() within the sandbox
PolicyPool.sandbox("plugin-out", this);
} catch (Throwable e) { e.printStackTrace(); } }
}
We assume that browser plugins extend the Plugin abstract class, by imple-
menting the method run(). The browser starts a plugin by invoking the method
doIt(), which is quite peculiar. Actually, it deﬁnes a sandbox, which will enforce
the policy plugin-out throughout the run of the plugin. This means that all the
security-relevant methods called while executing the method run() will be moni-
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tored, and blocked if not conformant to the policy. This policy is speciﬁed by the
usage automaton plugin-out below on the left, to be discussed in a while.
name: plugin-out name: plugin-cookies
aliases: aliases:
read := FileInputStream.<init>() cookie(u) := Browser.writeCookie(URL u,String m)
read := Browser.readCookie(URL u) cookie(u) := Browser.readCookie(URL u)
write := Socket.getOutputStream() init(p,u) := (p:Plugin).<init>(URL u)
states: q0 q1 fail start(p) := (p:Plugin).doIt()
start: q0 states: q0 q1 q2 fail
final: fail start: q0
trans: final: fail
q0 -- read --> q1 trans:
q1 -- write --> fail q0 -- init(p,u) --> q1
q1 -- start(p) --> q2
q2 -- cookie(u’) --> fail when u’!=u
q2 -- start(p’) --> q1 when p’!=p
A usage automaton closely resembles a ﬁnite state automaton. The ﬁeld tagged
name just deﬁnes the name of the policy. The tag aliases deﬁnes a mapping from
the signatures of security-relevant methods to events that trigger the transitions of
the usage automaton. E.g. in the usage automaton plugin-out above, the event
read is ﬁred whenever a new object of the class FileInputStream is created, or a
cookie is accessed through the method readCookie. Similarly, the event write is
ﬁred when the method getOutputStream is invoked on a Socket. The remaining
ﬁelds describe the logics of the automaton. The tag states is for the set of states,
start is for the initial state, and final is for the ﬁnal state, denoting a policy
violation. The tag trans preludes to the transition relation of the automaton. In
our example, a transition from q0 to q1 occurs upon reading any ﬁle or cookie.
A transition from q1 to fail occurs upon opening an output stream on a socket.
Since fail is oﬀending, this indeed implements the ﬁrst conﬁnement policy.
The second policy is speciﬁed by the usage automaton plugin-cookie, above
on the right, which introduces further peculiar features of Jalapa: parameters and
guards. We start from the state q0. The event init(p,u), signalling the creation of
a new plugin p with codebase URL u, causes a transition to q1. Upon a start(p),
i.e. when p is launched by the browser, we reach q2. There, all the accesses to
a cookie having a URL diﬀerent from u lead to the oﬀending state. When the
control is transferred to another plugin, we reset the state to q1. At run-time, the
policy plugin-cookie is enforced for all the possible instantiations of the formal
parameters p, u and u’. Since this policy spans over multiple activations of plugins,
we enforce it globally throughout the execution of the browser.
Once the needed policies and sandboxes have been deﬁned, the next step is to in-
strument the compiled program with the hooks from the security-relevant methods
to the execution monitor. Our tool implements this step as a bytecode transfor-
mation, discussed in more detail below. The resulting bytecode will respect all the
usage policies at hand, within their scopes (see [10] for usage details). In [2] we
formally prove that the run-time mechanism implemented by Jalapa is sound and
complete w.r.t. the speciﬁcation of policy compliance.
The Jalapa bytecode instrumentator. Our approach to code instrumentation
is based on class wrapping, at the bytecode level. Since this solution suﬀers from
some known issues, when moving to a production implementation we plan to follow
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a bytecode rewriting approach a` la Kava [12]. First, we detect the setM of all the
methods involved in policies. We inspect the bytecode, starting from the methods
used in the aliases, and then computing a transitive closure through the inheritance
graph. We create a wrapper for each of these methods. A wrapper WC for the class
C declares exactly the same methods of C, implements all the interfaces of C, and
extends the superclass of C. Indeed, WC can replace C in any context, in that it
admits the same operations of C. A method m of WC can be either monitored or not.
If the corresponding method m of C does not belong toM, then WC.m simply calls C.m.
Otherwise, WC.m calls the PolicyPool.check method that controls whether C.m can
actually be executed without violating the active policies. A further step substitutes
(the references to) the newly created classes for (the references to) the original
classes. Finally, the instrumented code is linked to the Jalapa run-time support,
i.e. a library that contains the resources necessary to the monitoring process. Note
that our instrumentation produces a stand-alone application, requiring no custom
JVM and no further external components.
The Jalapa runtime environment. The core of the enforcement mechanism is
the method PolicyPool.check() that, for each active policy, tracks the states of all
the needed usage automata. The state of the monitor is a mapping from policies to
sets of pairs ((O1, . . . , Ok), Q), where (O1, . . . , Ok) is a tuple of weak references to the
objects that substitute the formal parameters of the usage automaton, and Q is the
current state of the usage automaton. Dummy instantiations are also maintained,
to be concretized when new objects are discovered in the execution trace. When an
object is garbage-collected, its occurrences in the mechanism state are reverted to
dummies. If no usage automaton reaches an oﬀending state, the intercepted method
call is forwarded to the actual target; otherwise, a security exception is thrown.
Supporting artifacts. Jalapa is an open-source project. The sources are avail-
able through a Subversion repository at SourceForge [10]. Some further supporting
material is accessible through the project Web page:
• the Jalapa Tutorial, that provides programmers with a step-by-step guide for
securing Java programs with local usage policies.
• a repository of example programs and policies, including a prototype imple-
mentation of a secure bulletin board system.
• the manual page of policies, that deﬁnes their syntax and semantics.
• the manual page of the Jalapa rewriter, that deﬁnes its command-line syntax.
3 Discussion: present and future challenges
The Jalapa project started as an applicative branch of more foundational work on
history-based access control [3,4,5]. Porting this theoretical machinery to a concrete
setting like Java posed several issues. While our original goals have been achieved to
a fair degree by the current release of Jalapa, there is room for future improvements.
We devise three main research directions: (1) increasing the expressive power of
usage policies, (2) reducing the run-time overhead of the enforcement mechanism,
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and (3) developing programming tools and methodologies to facilitate writing secure
programs with Jalapa.
For the ﬁrst point, although our usage policies are quite general, they do not
cover all the possible real-world scenarios. We would like to require e.g. that a given
low-level method (e.g. a write-ﬁle) can only be invoked within the scope of some
high-level method that securely manages the low-level one. This is the case e.g. of
a change-password method that calls write-ﬁle to update passwords. The challenge
is to improve the expressive power of usage policies, while keeping them clean and
formally sound. A promising solution seems that of introducing aliases of the form
ev := C1.m1(...) { C2.m2(...) }, meaning that the event ev is ﬁred whenever
the method m1 of class C1 is invoked within the scope of the method m2 of class C2.
Another improvement would be to allow policies to mention the values returned by
methods. This can be done by generating “return” events, exposing these values.
For the second point, we are currently developing a static analyser for Java byte-
code, to detect those policies that are always respected in all the possible executions
of the application. The run-time enforcement can then be optimized, by discarding
the wrappers, and the associated execution monitoring, for the methods involved in
policies that are always respected. This static analysis can be split in two phases:
• in the ﬁrst phase, we extract from the bytecode a control ﬂow graph, and
we transform it into a history expression [4]. This is a sort of context-free
grammar, the language of which over-approximates all the possible traces of
events that the analysed program can generate at run-time.
• in the second phase, we reduce the inﬁnite-state system given by the history
expression to an equivalent ﬁnite one, and check it against the usage policies
mentioned by the sandboxes used in the program. This is done through a
model-checker. Only the policies that do not pass model checking need to be
enforced at run-time. This phase has been implemented by our LocUsT tool,
which runs in polynomial time in the size of the extracted history expression.
Further details about this phase can be found in [4,6].
For the third point, we are developing an Eclipse plugin that combines the
previous items into a programming environment, with facilities for writing policies,
sandboxing code, and for running the static analyses to discover which policies can
be disregarded by the security monitor. The LocUsT model checker, a prototype of
this ﬁrst analysis phase, and a prototype of the Eclipse plugin are distributed along
with the Jalapa sources through the SourceForge Subversion repository.
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